J'ai relu dernièrement toutes les "Shareholder Letters" rédigées par le plus grand investisseur de tous les temps depuis 1977. Elles sont disponibles gratuitement sur:
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/letters.html
Difficile de trouver quelqu'un qui allie à la fois des connaissances économiques aussi poussées, un bon sens à toute épreuve et un sens de l'humour aussi fin, même quand il s'agit de rire de lui-même.
J'ai sélectionné mes passages préférés afin de vous faire profiter de ces pensées intemporelles.
L'année se réfère toujours à celle de l'assemblée générale (par exemple, 2000 correspond à la lettre aux actionnaire de 2000 pour l'exercice comptable 1999).
2013:
You don’t need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren’t, you must recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. Keep things simple and don’t swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”
Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don’t feel comfortable making a rough estimate of the asset’s future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the ability to evaluate every investment possibility. But omniscience isn’t necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.
If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating. There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and I am skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their first toss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact that a given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.
When Charlie and I buy stocks – which we think of as small portions of businesses – our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings – which is usually the case – we simply move on to other prospects.
In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions. It’s vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our “circle of competence” and stay well inside of it. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters that occur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and a desire to be where the action is.
2016:
Some years, the gains in underlying earning power we achieve will be minor; very occasionally, the cash register will ring loud. Charlie and I have no magic plan to add earnings except to dream big and to be prepared mentally and financially to act fast when opportunities present themselves. Every decade or so, dark clouds will fill the economic skies, and they will briefly rain gold. When downpours of that sort occur, it’s imperative that we rush outdoors carrying washtubs, not teaspoons. And that we will do.
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Salut Jérôme.
Toi qui est un grand admirateur de Warren Buffet et de l’investissement, tu vas peut-être changer d’avis sur les options après avoir lu ceci: https://celtinvest.com/warren-buffett-trader-options
Voici quelques extraits de la nouvelle lettre aux actionnaires 2018 (pour l’exercice comptable 2017):
Our aversion to leverage has dampened our returns over the years. But Charlie and I sleep well. Both of us believe it is insane to risk what you have and need in order to obtain what you don’t need.
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Charlie and I view the marketable common stocks that Berkshire owns as interests in businesses, not as ticker symbols to be bought or sold based on their « chart » patterns, the « target » prices of analysts or the opinions of media pundits. Instead, we simply believe that if the businesses of the investees are successful (as we believe most will be) our investments will be successful as well. Sometimes the payoffs to us will be modest; occasionally the cash register will ring loudly. And sometimes I will make expensive mistakes. Overall – and over time – we should get decent results. In America, equity investors have the wind at their back.
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Though markets are generally rational, they occasionally do crazy things. Seizing the opportunities then offered does not require great intelligence, a degree in economics or a familiarity with Wall Street jargon such as alpha and beta. What investors then need instead is an ability to both disregard mob fears or enthusiasms and to focus on a few simple fundamentals. A willingness to look unimaginative for a sustained period – or even to look foolish – is also essential.
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Investing is an activity in which consumption today is foregone in an attempt to allow greater consumption at a later date. « Risk » is the possibility that this objective won’t be attained.
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I want to quickly acknowledge that in any upcoming day, week or even year, stocks will be riskier – far riskier – than short-term U.S. bonds. As an investor’s investment horizon lengthens, however, a diversified portfolio of U.S. equities becomes progressively less risky than bonds, assuming that the stocks are purchased at a sensible multiple of earnings relative to then-prevailing interest rates.
It is a terrible mistake for investors with long-term horizons – among them, pension funds, college endowments and savings-minded individuals – to measure their investment « risk » by their portfolio’s ratio of bonds to stocks. Often, high-grade bonds in an investment portfolio increase its risk.
Magnifique. Faudrait faire lire ça à ceux qui gèrent nos économies forcées dans le 2e pilier.
C’est bien vrai, nos caisses de pension pensent beaucoup trop à court terme et confondent volatilité et risque.
Je te conseille aussi la lecture à partir de la page 10. Warren Buffett avait fait un pari en 2007 et qui finissait en 2017 sur l’évolution d’un ETF sur le S&P500 vs. hedge fonds. Très instructif!
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2017ltr.pdf
Excellent. Une fois de plus. Ce gars est à la fois simple, modeste, visionnaire, pragmatique, imperturbable et diablement intelligent.
Voici le « best of » de la dernière lettre aux actionnaires de Berkshire Hathaway:
Berkshire will forever remain a financial fortress. In managing, I will make expensive mistakes of commission and will also miss many opportunities, some of which should have been obvious to me. At times, our stock will tumble as investors flee from equities. But I will never risk getting caught short of cash.
In the years ahead, we hope to move much of our excess liquidity into businesses that Berkshire will permanently own. The immediate prospects for that, however, are not good: Prices are sky-high for businesses possessing decent long-term prospects.
That disappointing reality means that 2019 will likely see us again expanding our holdings of marketable equities. We continue, nevertheless, to hope for an elephant-sized acquisition. Even at our ages of 88 and 95 – I’m the young one – that prospect is what causes my heart and Charlie’s to beat faster. (Just writing about the possibility of a huge purchase has caused my pulse rate to soar.)
My expectation of more stock purchases is not a market call. Charlie and I have no idea as to how stocks will behave next week or next year. Predictions of that sort have never been a part of our activities. Our thinking, rather, is focused on calculating whether a portion of an attractive business is worth more than its market price.
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It would be foolish for us to sell any of our wonderful companies even if no tax would be payable on its sale. Truly good businesses are exceptionally hard to find. Selling any you are lucky enough to own makes no sense at all.
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For 54 years our managerial decisions at Berkshire have been made from the viewpoint of the shareholders who are staying, not those who are leaving. Consequently, Charlie and I have never focused on current-quarter results.
Berkshire, in fact, may be the only company in the Fortune 500 that does not prepare monthly earnings reports or balance sheets.
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Over the years, Charlie and I have seen all sorts of bad corporate behavior, both accounting and operational, induced by the desire of management to meet Wall Street expectations. What starts as an “innocent” fudge in order to not disappoint “the Street” – say, trade-loading at quarter-end, turning a blind eye to rising insurance losses, or drawing down a “cookie-jar” reserve – can become the first step toward full-fledged fraud. Playing with the numbers “just this once” may well be the CEO’s intent; it’s seldom the end result. And if it’s okay for the boss to cheat a little, it’s easy for subordinates to rationalize similar behavior.
At Berkshire, our audience is neither analysts nor commentators: Charlie and I are working for our shareholder-partners. The numbers that flow up to us will be the ones we send on to you.
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We use debt sparingly. Many managers, it should be noted, will disagree with this policy, arguing that significant debt juices the returns for equity owners. And these more venturesome CEOs will be right most of the time.
At rare and unpredictable intervals, however, credit vanishes and debt becomes financially fatal. A Russian- roulette equation – usually win, occasionally die – may make financial sense for someone who gets a piece of a company’s upside but does not share in its downside. But that strategy would be madness for Berkshire. Rational people don’t risk what they have and need for what they don’t have and don’t need.
Sacré Warren. Je dois dire que ce gars me laisse admiratif tant par sa carrière, que sa performance boursière, mais aussi son intelligence, sa personnalité et sa simplicité au sens noble du terme.
Il est resté fidèle à ses principes tout au long de son existence et ses résultats lui donnent raison.
J’aime cette approche de se comporter comme un vrai investisseur, poussant presque le vice jusqu’à devenir plus ou moins le patron de l’entreprise.
Ça doit être grisant de prendre les commandes d’une boîte alors même qu’on y a jamais travaillé…
Ceci étant dit, il est clair que cette recette est difficilement applicable à nous tous.
Nous n’avons pas les mêmes moyens financiers et pas les mêmes sources d’informations (mais c’était aussi le cas de Warren au début).
Surtout, pour des retraités ou futurs retraités, investir ses billes seulement dans une poignée d’entreprises peut s’avérer risqué.
Nous avons besoin d’un revenu solide. Si nous concentrons nos avoirs dans un tout petit nombre de sociétés et qu’une d’entre elle se plante, c’est notre niveau de vie qui peut lourdement être impacté.
Je considère Warren comme un guide, une espèce de prophète. Je suis certaines de ses idées et j’adapte le reste en fonction de ma propre réalité.
Je suis également un grand fan du bonhomme et de la stratégie. Heureusement qu’il n’est pas nécessaire d’obtenir des résultats aussi exceptionnels que lui pour devenir rentier!
Quand la bourse pète un plomb, rien de tel que de lire la dernière lettre aux actionnaires de Warren Buffet! Je vous en propose deux extraits:
« We constantly seek to buy new businesses that meet three criteria. First, they must earn good returns on the net tangible capital required in their operation. Second, they must be run by able and honest managers. Finally, they must be available at a sensible price. »
« Anything can happen to stock prices tomorrow. Occasionally, there will be major drops in the market, perhaps of 50% magnitude or even greater. But the combination of The American Tailwind, about which I wrote last year, and the compounding wonders described by Mr. Smith, will make equities the much better long-term choice for the individual who does not use borrowed money and who can control his or her emotions. Others? Beware! »
l’American tailwind prend l’eau en ce moment
Il faut voir le côté positif… Cela plombe le bilan de Trump et compromet sa réélection.